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DOES THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE PASS THE LEMON 
TEST? 
MONTE KULIGOWSKI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2004, Walt Disney Pictures released the motion picture, 
“National Treasure.”1 The main character, Benjamin Gates, 
discovers that the United States Declaration of Independence 
contains a treasure map on the backside of its old parchment, leading 
to unfathomable wealth of unprecedented historic significance. Gates 
discovers the symbols of the map because they are not apparent to the 
natural eye. One must look through a special lens to find the treasure. 
So it is with the real Declaration. We need not look to fantasy to 
discover unfathomable wealth of unprecedented historic significance. 
Hidden from the dualistic, secular eye, we find in the document the 
secret of our country’s greatness. 
America’s national treasure has always been her faith in God. Not 
a ceremonial faith, but a real, substantive faith—a faith so strong that 
it is self-evident that our rights are from God. It is a faith that believes 
the Creator of mankind is actually there and even national 
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 1. NATIONAL TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004). 
I 
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governments are wise in acknowledging and imploring His kind 
assistance and protection. 
The Declaration is not a petition of redress; it is a document of 
interposition, where government representatives assert the rights of 
the populace against the wishes of the presently controlling, albeit 
oppressive, government.2 The Declaration declares a complete 
dissolving of allegiance, and thus, it provides the rudiments of true 
freedom, starting from a blank sheet, so to speak. “Our Revolution,” 
reflects Thomas Jefferson in 1824, “presented us with an album on 
which we were free to write what we pleased. We had no occasion to 
search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to 
investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. 
We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our 
hearts.”3 
The foundational thesis of the Declaration is uncomplicated, yet 
overwhelming: fundamental laws and rights are from God and no 
king is above the law. 
As you read on, bear in mind the significance of the preeminent 
document that will be scrutinized in this Article. The Declaration’s 
quill pen symbols of meaning provided the very foundation for the 
United States Constitution. Indeed, the Declaration is the 
constitution of the Constitution. The Declaration cannot be severed 
from the Constitution without draining the lifeblood from the latter. 
Without the former, the latter does not become a living Constitution, 
but a dead one. 
 
 2. The adverse response to the petitions of redress of the first Continental Congress led to 
the measures of the second Continental Congress. 
 3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 45–46 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905). 
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Without the Declaration, the Constitution has no transcendent 
point of reference for meaning and purpose. And without application 
of the principles and convictions contained in the Declaration during 
judicial constitutional analysis, court rulings on matters of religion 
are often at odds with, and unable to support, the values of the 
individual communities across the country.  Hence, contemporary 
jurisprudence has not produced a living diversity, but a dying 
conformity to centralized decrees. 
It is important to remember that for approximately the first 150 
years of the country’s short history, establishment claims were sparse 
and related only to congressional spending and religion.4  A majority 
of the states had not attempted to nationally establish the majority 
religion in the constitutionally forbidden manner—through an act of 
Congress. 
Nevertheless, with the advent of Everson v. Board of Education5 in 
1947—where the U.S. Supreme Court casually reached back seventy-
nine years to the Fourteenth Amendment6 to apply the 156 year-old 
federalism Establishment Clause against the states7—earth-shaking 
change was forthcoming. 
 
 4. The only two direct Establishment Clause cases prior to Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 U.S. 1 (1947), were Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), and Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 
U.S. 50 (1908). Both cases involved federal aid and religion, and neither ruling found that the 
federal government had established religion. 
 5. 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ratified July 9, 1868. 
 7. For a comparison, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), where, although the 
Court did not incorporate the First Amendment, it stated: “[W]e do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.” The religion clause was 
unaffected until 1940, and its Establishment Clause was incorporated in 1947. See Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating in a free exercise matter, the Fourteenth 
Amendment “embraces the [religious] liberties” of the First Amendment); see also Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ruling that, on the authority of the Free Exercise Clause, the 
City of Jeannette could not require a religious group to purchase a business license for books and 
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At first, on the Court’s brave new course of meddling in state 
matters of religion, the pre-quake tremors were barely noticeable.  
But in the early 1960s, the time-honored religious traditions of the 
states, municipalities, and even school districts would be met with 
federal disapproval.  Application of the doctrine of incorporation 
meant that any practice the Supreme Court deemed impermissible, 
in any local school district, for example, became unlawful for every 
school district across the country.  The localities became 
nationalized.  The country was (and continues to be) forced to 
become homogeneous.  Ironically, the religious homogeneity of the 
country was the very problem the Court was trying to fix (herein one 
will find the catalyst for the new rules of Establishment Clause 
interpretation).  After decades of declaring public religious 
expression unconstitutional at the state and local level (most notably 
in the educational institutions that transmit values), new, 
postmodern, post-Christian generations have emerged.  
Approximately sixty years later, we find a new, homogeneous 
America; only now it is, or is at least becoming, a secular nation, 
having no real connection to its own past. 
Once public perception on church and state (really, God and 
state) had changed, as well as religious thinking in general, first in the 
Supreme Court (and with the intelligentsia) and then throughout 
every locality in the country, it became a matter of time before the 
citizenry would turn to challenge the religious tradition at the federal 
level.  Presently, nothing is self-evident, including the conviction that 
our rights are from God—or that the hand of Divine blessing and 
protection of our country is necessary for our happiness and 
posterity.  There no longer exists much of a connection between the 
 
pamphlets sold in the course of door-to-door proselytizing). For discussion of the doctrine of 
incorporation, see infra section V. 
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religious relics and language of our past and their once-exalted 
status.  Thus, we have seen and will continue to see challenges to 
government chaplaincy, proclamations, congressional prayer, the flag 
pledge, the national motto, monuments, oaths of office, and so on. 
We are now beginning to see the Supreme Court in a position 
where it must attempt to prevent the absurd (arguably, further 
absurdities) from occurring.  The problem the Court faces is that it 
cannot stop the logical conclusions of its own rulings. To be 
consistent, even the Court’s own religious inscriptions (the Ten 
Commandments, et al) must come down from its courthouse, and its 
opening prayers must cease.  The Court has opened the floodgates 
through its rulings and now finds itself vainly bailing water with its 
own problematic precedent.  Activists armed with legal precedent 
have every reason to believe they can erase every remaining vestige of 
our religious heritage from memory.  Current legal doctrine, as we 
will see, is on their side. 
The title of this piece, hopefully, contains some shock value.  
Subjecting the Declaration to constitutional analysis ought to draw 
attention to the state of the contemporary establishment doctrine.  
Perhaps, the natural conclusion of contemporary analysis will invoke 
cause for serious reflection and reevaluation.  In the 2004 flag pledge 
case, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,8 Justice Thomas 
explained why the Court accepted the case: 
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Elk 
Grove Unified School District’s Pledge policy violates the 
Constitution.  The answer to that question is: ‘no.’ But in a 
testament to the condition of our Establishment Clause 
 
 8. 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). Newdow was reversed on a standing 
technicality, but three Justices (including Justice Thomas) reviewed the substantive issues, 
concluding that the matter was properly before the Court. 
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jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals reached the opposite 
conclusion based on a persuasive reading of our precedent . . . .9 
The Justice also observed that we have reached the point where 
we now have “opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the 
Establishment Clause.”10 
After reviewing contemporary establishment doctrine, this 
Article will apply its neutrality principle to the government’s religious 
expression found in the Declaration. Following a final appraisal of 
the doctrine of incorporation—noting that the Establishment Clause 
became blurred only after incorporation—I conclude that the most 
sensible recourse calls for the relinquishing of Everson usurpation 
and the ousting of its doctrines.11 
II 
THE QUESTION OF THE RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION 
Before cutting into the coppice of this Article, let us refresh our 
minds with the potentially offensive and prohibited language of the 
Declaration.  The relevant provisions for juridical review are 
contained throughout the document adopted by the Continental 
Congress on July 4, 1776 to legally justify the break from the British 
Crown.  The question is whether the national declaration can survive 
constitutional scrutiny when it is laced with and supported by 
religious dogma and belief. 
The following excerpts from the Declaration contain the relevant 
language for analysis: 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause 
applies to the states, as well as to the federal government); see also discussion infra Parts V, VI.  
The statement above will be developed in this Article. By “doctrines,” the author refers to 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and to government neutrality with religion. 
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[T]he Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them [one 
people], a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires 
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the 
Separation. 
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
Pursuit of Happiness . . . . 
WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES of 
AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the 
Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, 
do . . . solemnly Publish and Declare, that these United Colonies 
are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT 
STATES . . . . 
And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on 
the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.12 
III 
THE CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE OF  
CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION 
At the outset, observe how the Establishment Clause is written: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”13  The second clause of free 
exercise is included in the quotation because the clauses are 
interdependently related and together compose one sentence of 
 
 12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The original religion clause for the Bill of 
Rights, as proposed by James Madison, sheds some light on the earliest intentions and scope of 
the clause: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, 
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be 
in any manner, or on any pretence, infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (June 8, 1789). “The 
real object of the [Establishment Clause] was . . . to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and 
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the 
exclusive patronage of the national government.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 § 1871 (1833). 
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thought.  The Free Exercise Clause cannot have real meaning without 
the proper operation of the preceding clause.  That is, manipulation 
of the words Congress, law and establishment will necessarily impact 
the free exercise of religion and, for our purposes, may even prohibit 
the free exercise of religion in the drafting of a government 
declaration. 
The road that leads from the plain language of the Establishment 
Clause to the added language of the Supreme Court (in interpreting 
the plain language) is bumpy and winding, indeed, and 
Establishment Clause meaning and methodology continues to be 
under construction.  Concurring in Abington School District v. 
Schempp, Justice Brennan professes the elusive goal of deciding 
religion cases: “[T]he line we must draw between the permissible and 
the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully 
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.”14  Nevertheless, 
First Amendment establishment doctrine has become what it is.  
Now that Congress no longer means Congress and law no longer 
means law, several provisional tests15 for defining establishment are 
set on the judicial table for individual consideration. If the relevant 
religious expression fails just one test, it is ruled unconstitutional. 
The initial notion that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the 
First Amendment religion provisions began with Cantwell v. 
Connecticut,16 and the Establishment Clause was turned on its head 
 
 14. 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963). 
 15. See infra part III subsection B for a synopsis of the five tests currently used by the Court 
to determine whether government has established religion.  Of course, the inquiry involves any 
level of federal and state government, including local townships and school districts. And the 
government religious expression under review need not correlate to a duly enacted law, but 
merely a non-written practice, policy or tradition. 
 16. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  Embracing the Establishment Clause with the long arm of the 
14th Amendment implies that state religious expression may be regulated by the federal courts. 
When the Court says the 14th Amendment embraces, absorbs or incorporates a clause from the 
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just seven years later in Everson v. Board of Education,17 when Justice 
Black announced his six commandments that Congress and the 
states and their municipalities shall not do.18  The second 
commandment, seemingly pulled out of the midair clouds of Mount 
Sinai, without supporting precedent, would lay the groundwork for 
future Establishment Clause tests under the new concept of 
government neutrality with religion.  The neutrality rule, which 
states that neither the federal nor state governments “can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another,”19 would become the Achilles’ Heel of all future attempts for 
the Court to produce a systematic establishment doctrine with any 
semblance of consistency and predictability.  Indeed, the common 
 
Bill of Rights, it categorically grants itself jurisdiction over the states. See infra section V for an 
overview of the doctrine of incorporation. 
 17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), was a dollars and cents establishment 
case where the question was whether parents of parochial students could be reimbursed by the 
state for bus fees in like manner as parents of public school students.  The Court ruled that the 
reimbursement law was constitutional and, therefore, reminiscent of its rulings in Cantwell, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940), and Murdock, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court came riding in to the local town to 
protect free religious expression—armed with the First Amendment. 
 18. Justice Black’s commandments are as follows: 
[1] Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. [2] Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
[3] Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. [4] No person 
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. [5] No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. [6] Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. 
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 15–16. Some of the six rules make good historic sense in terms of limiting 
the federal government via the Bill of Rights (the states have their own religious clauses and have 
a constitutional right to self-government in the non-delegated area of religion). Respecting the 
national Congress, rule one encapsulates the primary purpose of the Establishment Clause. Rule 
two is patently false even applied solely to the federal government (as this Article will show, the 
Declaration could not have been adopted under this test). Rules three and four are unquestionably 
true. Rule five is true if it is referring to a positive tax and not tax exemption. And who can say 
what rule six means? 
 19. Id. at 15. 
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threads binding together the mass of confusion known as 
establishment doctrine are the valiant efforts of the individual 
Justices to uphold the concept of neutrality while simultaneously 
making legal and historic sense.20 “The most lasting legacy of 
Everson,” notes Donald Beschle, “would be the confident assertion 
that government must maintain a strict neutrality, not merely among 
religions, but between religion in general and irreligion.”21  We must 
therefore remember that all subsequent tests invented and used by 
the Court (to define establishment) are merely subsets and 
expressions of the neutrality principle. 
A. A Closer Look at Everson 
In review of the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education,22 
let us examine the reasoning of Justice Black relating to federal 
jurisdiction and the concept of government neutrality. 
Initially, we will notice Justice Black’s cavalier rephrasing of the 
religion clause in the Bill of Rights: “The First Amendment, as made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth . . . commands that a state 
‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”23  With a few strokes of the 
pen, the Justice amended “Congress shall make no law” with an 
 
 20. The Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)), noted that “[t]he [Establishment] Clause erects a ‘blurred, indistinct, 
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.’” Everson 
usurpation (incorporation) and neutrality necessarily produce judicial subjectivity and blurred 
vision. Establishment jurisprudence is thus consistently inconsistent and predictably 
unpredictable. 
 21. Donald L. Beschle, Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles 
in the United States and Canada, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 451, 456 (2002). 
 22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 23. Id. at 8 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). One can only imagine the level of anguish 
Jefferson or Madison would suffer at the sight of those words after laboring to add language to 
protect the states from the federal government. 
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editorial note in the margin of the Constitution: “Add local school 
district here.”  It was one small step for the Court, but one giant leap 
for the nation.  Next, the Justice is so bold as to pretend that his 
inverted statement above contains the words of the actual clause: 
“These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early 
Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which 
they fervently wished to stamp out . . . .”24  He continues, by stating 
that, “[d]oubtless their goal has not been entirely reached . . . .”25 
Therefore, the Supreme Court in 1947 is prepared to establish 
precedent in a brash effort to help those early Americans reach the 
Court’s ill-advised perception of their goal. 
Notwithstanding Justice Black’s dramatic historical narrative and 
grandiose goal, one of the major problems for the Court regarding 
the “evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to 
be written into our Bill of Rights,”26 is that no historic scholarship 
maintains that the Bill of Rights was written for any reason other 
than to control the power of the federal government.  No one can 
argue that the Court’s rewriting of the Establishment Clause 
presently “commands that a state”27 does or refrains from doing what 
the Court says.  But, the preeminent question asks whether the Court 
had the authority to rewrite the Bill of Rights in the first place.  
Indeed, as stated by Justice Marshall in 1833, contrary to what Justice 
Black asserts, the “serious fears” the early Americans entertained 
were that federal power might be “exercised in a manner dangerous 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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to liberty.”28  Moreover, “[the Bill of Rights] demanded security 
against the apprehended encroachments of the general [federal] 
government—not against those of the local governments.”29 Closing 
the door on ambiguity, Justice Marshall concludes that, “[t]hese 
amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply 
them to the state governments.”30 
In the later Everson opinion, approximately eight paragraphs and 
1,799 words separate Justice Black’s above rephrasing of the religion 
clause from his infamous use of Thomas Jefferson’s wall of separation 
statement.  A casual reader cannot help but notice that, setting 
personal opinion and drama aside, the Court relies upon no direct 
precedent to support its very specific statements of newly-formulated 
establishment doctrine. 
What the Court does cite neither supports its alleged right to 
unilaterally amend the Constitution nor its new doctrine of state 
(and federal) neutrality with religion.  Instead, the Court cites an act 
of the Virginia Assembly known as the Virginia Bill for Religious 
Liberty, which was, like the Declaration, written in large part by 
 
 28. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). The Court also states: “In 
compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, 
amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted by the states.” Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. Additionally, 
[i]f the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws 
this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the 
powers of the general government, and on those of the states; if, in every inhibition 
intended to act on state power, words are employed which directly express that intent; 
some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course 
in framing the amendments, before that departure can be assumed. We search in vain 
for that reason. Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required changes in 
their constitutions; had they required additional safe-guards to liberty from the 
apprehended encroachments of their particular governments: the remedy was in their 
own hands, and would have been applied by themselves. 
Id. at 249. 
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Thomas Jefferson.  The Court quotes part of the preamble of that bill 
as follows: 
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to 
influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil 
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and 
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author 
of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose 
not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ; that to compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even 
the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own 
religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty 
of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals 
he would make his pattern . . . .31 
The fact that the states are quite capable of enacting their own 
bills of religious rights lends little to support the Court’s conclusion 
that the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights of the United 
States Constitution was meant to be anything other than a safeguard 
from federal power in matters of the states’ free exercise of religion. 
In the quote above, take note of the phrase, “The Holy author of 
our religion who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to 
propagate it by coercions.”  That is quite a statement.  To whom 
might Virginia be referring to as “Lord?”  Those words do not exactly 
support the contemporary concept of state neutrality with religion.  
Also, I invite the reader to reexamine the mini-phrase within the 
phrase: “Our religion.”  The fact that we find reference to Virginia’s 
general, non-mandated religion in the bosom of the foremost 
document guaranteeing religious freedom and forbidding coercive 
action of the state ought to say something about the state’s right of 
preferring its founding religion over others.32 
 
 31. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1947) 
 32. In 1833, Joseph Story stated the following: 
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After quoting the Virginia law, the Court in Everson then, in 
either ignorance or arrogance, says, “[t]his Court has previously 
recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the 
drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such 
leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide 
the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious 
liberty as the Virginia statute.”33  Of course, one of the minor details 
Justice Black omits is that the objective of the First Amendment was 
to safeguard the states from the federal government.34  If Justice 
Black’s reasoning is correct then Virginia must surrender the very 
religious rights and expression overtly contained in its own bill—
which the Court amazingly cites to justify its usurpation. 
Finally, we get to Justice Black’s misplaced use of Jefferson’s wall 
of separation statement, with supporting citation to Reynolds v. 
United States (1878).35 Another glittering problem for the Everson 
Court is that Reynolds uses Jefferson’s phrase in sound historic and 
legal context (and, of course, Everson, does not).  In Reynolds, the 
Court acknowledges the wall keeping the federal government out of 
state religion, but holds that no wall exists with respect to the federal 
 
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the [First Amendment], 
now under consideration, the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, 
that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not 
incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious 
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold 
all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal 
indignation. 
3 STORY, supra note 13, at § 1868.  
 33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); 
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)). None 
of the cases cited even remotely support the Court’s position in Everson. 
 34. See supra notes 13, 28–30. 
 35. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164). 
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Congress enacting criminal laws for the pre-state territories, even if 
such laws conflict with practice motivated by religious belief. 
The following is from Reynolds, where the Court quotes Jefferson 
and applies the Jeffersonian remark to its ruling: 
Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a 
committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, took occasion to 
say: “Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other 
for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the 
government reach actions only, and not opinions—I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between 
church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will 
of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with 
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend 
to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no 
natural right in opposition to his social duties.” Coming as this 
does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the 
measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative 
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus 
secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere 
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation 
of social duties or subversive of good order.36 
Jefferson wrote to the Baptist Association on January 1, 1802, 
during his presidency, in response to the Association’s inquiry 
regarding federal power and the church.37  In his reply, he addressed 
the short reach of the federal government’s power with respect to the 
church by quoting the religion clause of the First Amendment—
followed with the infamous words, “thus building a wall of separation 
 
 36. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (internal citations omitted). 
 37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802) in 16 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 3, at 281–82. 
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between church and state.”38  In context of Jefferson’s letter, the 
legislature of the whole American people (Congress) runs directly 
into a brick wall in any attempt to dictate the church’s opinions and 
beliefs. 
The use of Jefferson’s phrase was in perfect context for the issue 
before the Court in Reynolds.  For in Reynolds, the Court ruled that 
Congressional power does in fact reach actions regardless of religious 
belief—if the actions are criminal.  So, while a high wall keeps 
Congress out of state religious matters, there is not so much as a 
picket fence when it comes to criminal behavior. “Congress was 
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,” writes Justice 
Waite, “but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order.”39 
Justice Waite, in Reynolds, viewed the wall keeping the federal 
government out of local religious affairs with high esteem, using 
Jefferson’s letter to support a commonsense exception.  Justice Black, 
in Everson, on the contrary, tore down the wall raised by the Bill of 
Rights, allowing the federal courts to ransack the sacred cities.  And 
using Jefferson’s words out of context, he erected his own artificial 
wall, which has been used ever since to command government 
neutrality and separation of public religious expression from the 
states and their localities. 
Thereafter, by following the precedent handed down in Everson, 
the Supreme Court would go on to build an entire body of 
establishment doctrine upon a foundation of sinking sand. 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
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B. Lemon and Beyond 
The overarching principle of neutrality was eventually formulated 
into a three-prong analysis in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.40 
Drawing, inter alia, from Board of Education v. Allen,41 and Walz v. 
Tax Commission,42 the Court spelled out the structure of its scrutiny. 
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”43 If the relevant statute 
(and presently, language, symbol or practice) fails any of the three 
tests, it is deemed to be unconstitutional and hence, illegal.44 
When Justice O’Connor advanced the endorsement test in the 
case of Lynch v. Donnelly45 in 1984, we must not forget that she also 
was under the influence of the alluring drink of neutrality.  In the 
words of the Justice, “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits 
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way 
to a person’s standing in the political community.”46  Under the test, 
the state violates the proscription of making religious adherence 
relevant by either excessive entanglement or “government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”47  The endorsement test as 
proposed is really a two-prong entanglement/endorsement test, but 
in keeping with custom, this Article will employ a separate 
 
 40. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 41. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). 
 42. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
 43. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasis added) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). 
 44. Id. 
 45. 465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. at 687–88. 
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endorsement subheading.  The prohibitive message that government 
endorsement purportedly sends to “nonadherents [is] that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
[endorsement sends] an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”48 
The coercion test finds its modern antecedents in McCollum v. 
Board of Education,49 where we find reference to indirect or subtle 
coercion “through use of the State’s compulsory public school 
machinery.”50  By the time the coercion test was articulated in Lee v. 
Weisman,51 the indirect-coercion-by-coercive-atmosphere doctrine 
had been fairly developed in pre-Lemon school district cases 
involving prayer and Bible reading in the early 1960s.52 
The five tests above are not all applied by every Supreme Court 
Justice in every establishment question case.53  The Court has 
“repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any 
single test or criterion in this sensitive area.”54  Inasmuch as they are 
 
 48. Id. at 688 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)). 
 49. 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948). 
 50. Id. at 212, 217. 
 51. 505 U.S. 577 592–99 (1992).  See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 
2002) (insisting that the coercion test is said to have been “first used by the Court in Lee”). 
 52. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading). 
 53. Often, when the Court wants to uphold a government religious expression, neutrality 
principles are simply set aside. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) 
(referring to a granite monument standing six-feet tall by three-feet wide and bearing the Ten 
Commandments, the Court noted, “[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger 
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of 
passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.  Instead, our analysis is driven 
both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history”). For another example see 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where, interestingly, Chief Justice Burger, who had 
gleaned and articulated the three neutrality elements in Lemon, refused to apply any of them in 
his Marsh opinion.  Incidentally, Marsh involved a Presbyterian minister paid with state funds to 
serve as a legislative chaplain. 
 54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). 
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ladled out of the same pot of neutrality, the tests are often mixed and 
matched and are used differently by different Justices.  For example, 
as was noted above, Justice O’Connor relied upon only the 
entanglement and endorsement tests to fashion her concurring 
opinion in Lynch.55  Nevertheless, in an attempt to leave no 
touchstone unturned, this Article will consider each of the five tests. 
IV 
THE DECLARATION AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 
A. Secular Legislative Purpose 
We must note first that the legislative part of purpose is presently 
a misnomer. The entire concept and requirement of Congress 
passing a law has been eliminated as an unnecessary inquiry in 
contemporary establishment jurisprudence.  We are only concerned 
with whether the Declaration has an actual secular purpose.56 
We will examine the religious nature of the Declaration under 
subsequent subheadings, but for now we are in search of a genuine 
secular motivation.  With that being the case, we may pass through 
this subsection rather quickly concluding that the Declaration, of 
course, has a secular purpose.  Though we may easily discern men 
acknowledging, appealing to, relying upon and exalting the Supreme 
Judge of the world in the document, no tenable argument can be 
made that the Declaration was written for ecclesiastical or religious 
purposes—devoid of secular purpose.  The Declaration is an 
instrument of legal interposition, and its primary purpose was to 
formally lay out the reasons and justifications for declaring 
 
 55. Id. at 687–94. 
 56. Of course, with the present inquiry, the Declaration is the act of a federal legislative body 
and carries the full force of law. 
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independence from Great Britain.57  As such, the Declaration clearly 
passes the secular purpose part of the Lemon test. 
B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Prohibiting Religion 
Prior to considering the hallmarks of the effect test, let us consider 
the context of the public’s contact with the text of the Declaration.  
Most often people are introduced to the phraseology as students 
either in public or private school settings.  The teaching of certain 
academic disciplines requires examination, if only at some bare level, 
of the text of one of our most momentous founding documents.  
Even at minimum exposure, the reader will encounter religious 
words capable of offending sensibilities—words the reader might 
find offensive, repulsive and in direct opposition to one’s faith or 
belief. 
Indeed, in the very first sentence of the Declaration we encounter 
the word “God.”58 
In the subsequent sentence we find codified religious doctrines of 
presupposition and belief.  The religious doctrine of the Declaration’s 
second sentence may be construed as nothing less than six articles of 
religious faith: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights . . . .”59  First, we find an absolutist view of truth.  
Second, we see a proposition of religious epistemology.  Third, we 
cannot escape the religious doctrine of creation.  Fourth, a moral 
pronouncement of equality is based solely upon religion.  Fifth, we 
encounter the bold religious tenet that the Creator has gifted the 
reader with unalienable Rights.  And, sixth, we see the religious 
 
 57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 58. Id. para 1. 
 59. Id. para 2. 
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position that, if the rights are unalienable, the Creator has a higher 
authority than the state. 
“The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.”60  We have noted that the Declaration easily passes that 
test.  However, “[t]he effect prong asks whether, irrespective of 
government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact 
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.  An affirmative 
answer to either question should render the challenged practice 
invalid.”61 
The effect prong relating to the advancement of religion has been 
defined and characterized by the idea of government endorsement of 
religion, which means the two tests overlap, with the former perhaps 
being integrated into the latter. 
The Court in Allegheny noted that,  
[o]ur subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of 
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In 
recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether 
the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or 
effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place 
in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.62 
We should not be surprised that “the word ‘endorsement’ is not 
self-defining. Rather, it derives its meaning from other words that 
this Court has found useful over the years in interpreting the 
Establishment Clause.”63  To help us understand, Justice Blackmun 
explains that government may not “‘convey a message that religion 
 
 60. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. 
 62. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 436 (1962)). 
 63. Id. at 593. 
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or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’”64  
Additionally, neither the Congress nor the township may “‘favor 
religious belief over disbelief.’”65  Neither may the government adopt 
a “‘preference for the dissemination of religious ideas.’”66  The Justice 
also mentions Lynch to remind us that the word “endorsement is 
closely linked to the term promotion.”67 Epperson v. Arkansas is 
quoted for the long standing rule that “government ‘may not . . . 
promote one religion or religious theory against another . . . .’”68 
Finally, the Justice concludes by noting that the Court in Wallace, 
uses the “concepts of endorsement, promotion, and favoritism 
interchangeably.”69 
So how does Justice Blackmun tie it all together with respect to 
the question of whether the government’s actions have the primary 
effect of advancing religion? “Whether the key word is 
‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle 
remains the same.  The Establishment Clause, at the very least, 
prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions 
of religious belief . . . .”70 
One may abandon all hope of making sense of the Court’s 
reasoning and nevertheless conclude that the Declaration is in 
serious constitutional trouble under part two of the Lemon analysis.  
The problem any government religious expression encounters is that 
 
 64. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)). 
 65. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27–28 
(1989)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 691 (1984)). 
 68. Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
 69. Id. (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59–60). 
 70. Id. at 593–94. 
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the more terms (which are not self-defining) the Court adds to its 
lexicon of Establishment Clause interpretive theory, the greater the 
odds of the relevant expression failing constitutional muster.  After 
all, the relevant government religious practice or expression will fall 
if it does not measure up to just one Court-defined term.  Just from 
the brief recital of Justice Blackmun, above, the Declaration 
encounters a fleet of contact mines that it must successfully navigate 
to earn the neutrality stamp of the Supreme Court. 
It is sensible to start with what the Establishment Clause prohibits 
at the very least: if appearing to take a position on questions of 
religious belief is a violation, then the government via the 
Declaration collides head-on with the effect test.  In the Declaration, 
the government does far more than appearing to take a position.  The 
government articulates its own religious beliefs, leaving no question 
as to its position. 
One of the many subtests of the test as articulated by the Court in 
Wallace v. Jaffree is that the government is precluded “from 
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”71  In Wallace, the 
state legislature attempted to convey a message that prayer was 
favored over non-prayer meditation.  The issue before the Court was 
the constitutionality of three state statutes which authorized a daily, 
one-minute period of silence in the public schools for meditation; 
meditation or voluntary prayer; and for willing students, a prescribed 
prayer to Almighty God, the Creator and Supreme Judge of the 
world.72 
 
 71. 472 U.S. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 40.  The statutes were enacted in 1978, 1981, and 1982, respectively.  Id. 
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In consideration of the legislative history and the plain 
progression of the statutes toward favoring prayer, Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court, concluded that “the Alabama Legislature 
intended to change existing law and that it was motivated . . . [by the] 
sole purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of prayer 
activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday [sic].”73  
Moreover, the Court noted that the “addition of ‘or voluntary prayer’ 
indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored 
practice.  Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established 
principle that the government must pursue a course of complete 
neutrality toward religion.”74  The established principle as succinctly 
articulated by Justice Stevens encapsulates the Court’s contemporary 
neutrality doctrine in one sentence. 
The state legislators, above, may have intended to favor and 
endorse prayer and, thus, depart from the Court’s mandate of 
complete neutrality, but, in doing so they were following suit of 
certain federal legislators before them.  The government, speaking for 
all the people (in the Declaration), is found appealing to the Supreme 
Judge of the world with a specific petition for approval of their 
intentions and protection of their very lives. The voluntary prayer 
authorized by the state of Alabama was to the same “Supreme Judge 
of the world,”75 yet, interestingly, there is neither citation nor 
reference to the Declaration in the Wallace opinion. 
Concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, Justice 
Goldberg boldly states that, “[t]he fullest realization of true religious 
liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism among sects 
 
 73. Id. at 60. 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
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or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of 
no religious belief.”76  Certainly, an atheist is likely to view the 
relevant religious language in the Declaration as a disapproval of his 
religious choice, while a monotheist is likely to exclaim, “Amen.”  In 
shocking contrast to neutrality precedent, the government made no 
provision to accommodate those who reject the religious doctrine of 
the Declaration.  We do not find one clause that says, “We hold these 
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” 
countered by another which says, “Of course, some of us do not hold 
those propositions as truths and, therefore, base the right for freedom 
not upon god-given rights, but upon wide-ranging conceptions of 
mankind’s inherent right of self realization, autonomous from the 
restraints of conventional belief in a creator or a god.” 
The Court in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, admonishes the Lone Star 
State, as follows: “[B]y confining the tax exemption exclusively to the 
sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support 
for the communication of religious messages.”77  Moreover, Justice 
Blackmun insists that, “[a] statutory preference for the dissemination 
of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the 
Establishment Clause is all about and hence is constitutionally 
intolerable.”78 
The Declaration’s message, of course, was meant to be 
disseminated—along with its well-articulated religious ideas and 
theories, which are endorsed, favored and promoted by the 
government in its dissemination. 
 
 76. 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 77. 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
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In wrapping this inquiry up, we must ask the following rhetorical 
question: Though the Declaration was written to achieve a secular 
purpose, does it nevertheless have the primary effect of either 
advancing or prohibiting religion?79  Arguably, the original, primary 
effect of the Declaration was to instill nationalism and patriotism; but 
even then, the government used religion to do so.  The government 
conveyed a message of endorsing one particular religious belief while 
remaining conspicuously silent regarding other beliefs and non-
religious beliefs. 
Of course, the Revolutionary War has long been over. When 
contemporary non-adherents are made to encounter religious 
language they find utterly offensive, it becomes difficult to imagine 
the document having any effect other than advancing a repugnant 
religion upon the conscience of the objecting reader. 
If the Declaration fails one test, it falls short of the Court’s 
standard; but to perceive just how far it falls, let us go on to consider 
how the document is and is not written in light of the contemporary 
doctrine of entanglement. 
C. Excessive Government Entanglement with Religion 
Instrumental in positing a declaration of independence against a 
kingdom whose king is defined in the document as a “tyrant,” is 
stating the sure basis for doing so.  The excitement of fight or flight 
was in the revolutionary air in 1776, and the unified sentiment was 
fight until freedom was secured.  As soon as the ink of ratification 
had dried, flight was not an option.80 Prepared for full-scale war, and 
 
 79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (articulating and applying this 
three-pronged test). 
 80. Although historians credit the start of the Revolutionary War with the battles of 
Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, the Lee Resolution of July 2, 1776 and the Declaration 
solidified the inescapable course of either full national victory or defeat. 
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great risk of loss of life, the men of the Continental Congress looked 
to the surest possible foundation to support their intentions.  Never 
was there witnessed a more solemn time of deliberation over the 
future of a nation than when those men, sensible of danger and 
incalculable loss, looked to their Creator for the Rights they were 
claiming.  They believed the cause was just, noble and right because 
the cause found sanction from a Lawgiver higher than the state.  
Indeed, the adopters of the Declaration appealed to the Supreme 
Judge of the World for the “rectitude,” that is, the righteousness, of 
their intentions.  And, mindful of their frailty, they relied upon the 
protection of Divine Providence. 
The American founders believed that certain higher laws entitle 
nations to govern themselves independently from rule that is 
contrary to this authority.  That idea is so fundamental that it is a 
matter of natural law.81  Of course, the laws of nature are subject to 
their Creator; and it is to the Supreme Deity that people must also 
subject themselves in order to avail themselves of the rights, blessings 
and responsibilities associated with the operation of higher law. 
Observe that the Declaration is not content to stop with finite 
nature.  To stop there is to have no authority higher than the state.  
To stop there is to have nothing beyond the mind of man.  The 
 
 81. William Blackstone said that the “will of [the] maker is called the law of nature.” 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2 (1765). Another influence 
was John Locke: 
“The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and 
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind . . . that being all equal and independent, 
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions: for men being all 
the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one 
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order . . . ” 
2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 6 (1772); Charles Montesquieu added that, 
“The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us towards Him, is the 
first in importance, though not in order, of natural laws.” 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT 
OF LAWS § 2 (Thomas Nugent trans.) (1873). 
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American founders did not say that Nature and their brilliant 
reasoning entitled them to self-government, but rather the Laws of 
Nature and of Nature’s God entitled them.  The founders did not 
grant themselves their rights; they received them from God.  They 
did not create our fundamental rights; they applied them. They did 
not look to the state.  Rather, they looked to God. 
A naturalistic, secular world-view has no place in the Declaration.  
Within the four corners of the great document, man does not exist as 
the result of impersonal, cold, dead matter mysteriously coming 
alive, self-creating, breathing and thinking.  Man is not part of the 
machine living in a closed system.82  On the contrary, the finite has 
an infinite reference point found only in his Creator. All men were 
created equal says the Declaration, which is another way of saying all 
men were created in the image of God. Not only did the Creator 
endow men with breath, but also with unalienable rights—rights that 
cannot lawfully be taken away by the state.  So far, we see that the 
Declaration is anything but a secular or religiously neutral document. 
When the Founding Fathers, via the Declaration, appealed to the 
Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude to support the grand 
plan of independence, they were not appealing to one of many 
sources.  They cited no international court rulings.  Instead, they 
took their petition directly to the High Court of heaven and earth.  
No king had the authority to sanction what they were after; only the 
King of kings could bless and approve their endeavor.  The 
Declaration does not look to man for validation, but to God alone.  
The document does not rely upon human rights, but upon the God 
who endows men with unalienable rights.  The Declaration does not 
 
 82. The concept of the naturalistic man’s view of himself as being part of the machine in a 
closed system is borrowed from FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, HE IS THERE AND HE IS NOT SILENT 42–
48 (1972). 
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say that some of the founders appealed to their own reason, others to 
the secular state, others to the Tao, others to political theory, and still 
others to the general good of mankind. 
The document is profoundly interwoven with one monotheistic 
religion, and in the postlude of the Declaration, we find a statement 
of entanglement with this particular religion that equates to nothing 
less than dependence upon the God of the Declaration. The future of 
North America as united and free states depends entirely upon this 
clause: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance 
on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”83  Notice that 
the patriots pledged to each other their very lives; but also notice that 
there was a condition antecedent.  They did not pledge their lives 
until they had pledged themselves to the God who was actually able 
to protect and keep them.  That was not ceremonial religious 
language; that was religious language in the context of life and death.  
Here, we do not see a faint, superfluous acknowledgment of religion.  
On the contrary, we see a firm reliance on the protection of Divine 
Providence. Indeed, 230 years later, we can still feel the intensity of 
the religious conviction captured on the aging tablet. 
We thus find within the Declaration nothing less than a solemn 
prayer to the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world—a Judge who 
sees, hears and intervenes for those who trust in Him.  Every 
religious prayer is an appeal to some conceptual deity; in this 
important document of interposition, we find the government 
appealing to a very specific Deity, indeed. 
The God of the Declaration is notably large, powerful and 
authoritative.  As the Creator of man, He is the very source of life and 
 
 83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
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liberty. And this God is the substantive source of right and wrong 
(hence, the supplication to the Supreme Judge for the rectitude of 
their intentions).  The document’s language casts aside the 
contemporary definition of deism.  The God of the Declaration is 
personal, able, and apparently willing to watch over and protect 
individuals and the nation at large.  Having one eye on the 
parchment and the other looking ahead to the contest with Great 
Britain, we must conclude that the men of the Continental Congress 
in fact believed that this God could, and would, protect the nation as 
they placed themselves under His mighty hand of providence.  When 
considering the specific titles used for the God of the Declaration, 
together with His attributes, we must conclude that the American 
forefathers placed their trust firmly in none other than God 
Almighty. 
There scarcely could have been a greater instance of excessive 
entanglement between the state and religion as we find bound 
together by the iron pen of the Declaration.84 
The problem for the Declaration, of course, is that the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of excessive entanglement renders our preeminent 
document illegal as written.  In the political context of the 
Declaration, Chief Justice Burger explains that “a broader base of 
entanglement” inquiry involves the question of whether the relevant 
government expression carries the “potential” for political 
divisiveness based upon religion.85  Citing a law journal Comment to 
support its proposition, the Court continues: “Ordinarily political 
debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal 
and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, 
 
 84. NATIONAL TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004) (using the “iron pen” to refer to the 
strength and resolve with which the Declaration was written). 
 85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
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but political division along religious lines was one of the principal 
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”86  
That statement should be axiomatic because the “history of many 
countries attests to the hazards of religion’s intruding into the 
political arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and 
free exercise of religious belief.”87 
The act of government officials wrapping themselves in religious 
doctrine in support of the Declaration necessarily places its readers 
in the tenuous position of accepting or rejecting their country’s 
religious dogma.  The Declaration carries the potential for political 
divisiveness inasmuch as non-adherents might be made to feel less 
patriotic than adherents. 
D. Government Endorsement of Religion 
The last thought of the previous subsection creates a natural 
transition into our next test of endorsement. In fact, Justice 
O’Conner likely developed her political outsider conceptualization 
from, inter alia, the Lemon principle.  We have already seen that the 
effect test has been somewhat subsumed by the endorsement test.  
We may also follow the ruminations over “political divisiveness” 
from the entanglement test to their current form as expressed in the 
endorsement test. 
With that being the case, this subsection will focus on how the 
Declaration might make “adherence to a religion relevant . . . to a 
person’s standing in the political community.”88  That is, whether the 
 
 86. Id. Not so ironically, the Court’s misconception of the “evils” the First Amendment was 
intended to protect against are strikingly similar to those arguments first advanced by Justice 
Black in Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause 
applies to the states, as well as to the federal government). 
 87. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623. 
 88. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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government’s endorsement of religion via the Declaration sends a 
“prohibitive message” to non-adherents that “they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”89 
Well, it is difficult to imagine how government could make 
adherence to religion more relevant than by basing the future of the 
entire nation upon the power of its God to endorse and watch over 
the cause of freedom.  We may mark the operation of reciprocal 
endorsement: God is endorsing the government, and the government 
is endorsing the religion of the wise Creator. 
When the government speaks for everyone, applying the plural 
pronoun, “we,” (as in “We hold these truths to be self-evident”)90 
relevance certainly attaches. Everyone is dragged in and is presumed 
to hold the religious propositions that follow. That kind of 
homogeneous religious thinking, of course, runs amuck of what the 
Supreme Court says the Constitution says. 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,91 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Christmastime nativity scene (crèche) displayed 
on city property that included an angel bearing a banner 
proclaiming, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo!”92  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Blackmun concludes: “The government may acknowledge 
Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the First 
Amendment it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by 
suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.”93 
 
 89. Id. at 688. 
 90. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 91. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 92. Id. at 580. 
 93. Id. at 601. 
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That is an interesting and far-reaching conclusion, but it must be 
followed if contemporary doctrine is to be applied to the Declaration.  
Justice Blackmun suggests that by displaying the crèche, the City of 
Pittsburgh was “suggesting that people praise God for the birth of 
Jesus.”94  The angel’s statement, which is part of the history of the 
birth of Christ, was displayed in Latin.  The Declaration, on the 
contrary, is written in English.  If we must conclude that Pittsburgh 
was suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus from the 
angel’s Latin banner which is translated, “Glory to God in the 
Highest,” then we have yet another neutrality problem for the 
Declaration.  How do we not conclude that the government was 
suggesting that people should believe they were created by God and 
endowed with certain unalienable rights?  If you read Latin and 
understand that because the angel was giving glory to God, it is 
imputed that you also understand that the City of Pittsburgh is 
suggesting that you, like the angel, give glory to God. Applying that 
reasoning to the Declaration, when you read of the founders 
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world, it is imputed that you 
understand that the government is suggesting that you, like they, also 
appeal to the Supreme Judge of the world. 
The Court uses the nebulous “reasonable observer” to determine 
government endorsement and outsider status. In the nativity context 
above, the Court observed that a reasonable observer would conclude 
that government was endorsing religion.95  The “reasonable observer” 
is presumed to be “aware of the history and context of the 
community and forum in which the religious display appears.”96  By 
imputing to our reasonable observer the history and context of the 
 
 94. Id. at 620. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Declaration, one must ask whether such an observer would view the 
religious language as merely ceremonial or as a substantive 
expression of faith.  Does the religious language contain enough 
substance that our non-adhering observer would view the religious 
language as a disapproval of her particular religious choices? 
Would a non-adherent be made to feel that she is not part of the 
“We,” in “We hold these truths . . . ?”97  Is the atheist less worthy of 
the enumerated rights?  Is the non-believer a lesser member of the 
political community?  Certainly, the political force of the Declaration 
surpasses that of a nativity scene.  If a community’s seasonal 
placement of a nativity scene causes individuals to feel as though they 
are political outsiders, how much more will non-adherents feel like 
outsiders who reject the enduring religious principles on which the 
Declaration rests? 
E. Government Coercion 
“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution 
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”98  
The dual clinchers of that sentence from Lee v. Weisman are “or 
otherwise act” and “or tends to do so.”99  So how might the 
government coerce or otherwise act or otherwise tend to do so? 
The contemporary Court, of course, is not looking for actual 
coercion or even actual establishment, for that matter, but for any 
 
 97. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 98. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 
(1984)); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (quoting Everson v. Bd. 
of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)). 
 99. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
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violation of the complete neutrality principle.  In the Lee case, which 
has become known for its coercion test articulation, the question was 
whether the First Amendment prohibits local public school officials 
from inviting clergy members to offer invocations and benedictions 
at graduation ceremonies.100  The nonsectarian prayers at issue were 
offered by a local Jewish rabbi and contained the word “God” twice—
once in the invocation and once in the benediction.101  The word 
“Lord” was also used once in the benediction. God was thanked for 
the “legacy of America,” for endowing the students with the “capacity 
for learning,” and for “keeping us alive, sustaining us, and allowing 
us to reach this special, happy occasion.”102  Rabbi Gutterman also 
asked for the blessings of God upon the teachers and administrators 
and for “strength and guidance” for the graduates.103 
Subtle and indirect pressure to participate in religious expression 
“can be as real as any overt compulsion,” says Justice Kennedy, 
armed with the latest “research in psychology.”104  The question of 
whether the Court should be determining and quantifying student 
psychological peer pressure is beyond the reach of this Article, but 
within its reach are the implications of the following statement of the 
Court: “But for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable 
perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner 
her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real [than overt 
compulsion].”105 
 
 100. Id. at 581. 
 101. Id. at 581–83. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 581–82. 
 104. Id. at 593–94. 
 105. Id. at 593. 
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That, unfortunately for the Declaration, is the precedent we must 
apply to our analysis.  The Court establishes precedent allowing a 
student’s perception that she is being forced to pray at a graduation 
ceremony to be classified as a “reasonable perception.”106  As we 
review the Court-defined coercive atmosphere of the graduation 
ceremony, we find only that the audience was asked to stand for the 
“two minutes or so” of invocation and benediction.107  The dissenting 
student was not forced to stand, nor make any gesture nor pray nor 
utter any word.108 
Similar to the reasoning in Allegheny, where a reasonable 
observer would interpret the city as suggesting that she praise God 
because of the crèche,109 here, the reasonable dissenter interprets the 
school district as forcing her to pray because of the rabbi’s 
invocation.110  Even though she is not actually praying (and may even 
be loathing the rabbi’s prayer in the silent dissent of her mind), the 
Court holds that she has the reasonable perception that she is in fact 
being forced by the state to pray.111 
Inasmuch as the dissenter perceives she is being forced to pray, 
the Court also perceives that she sustains injury by virtually praying; 
and her injuries are no less real than if she had been forced by the 
state to actually deliver Rabbi Gutterman’s nonsectarian prayer. “The 
injury caused by the government’s action . . . is that the State, in a 
school setting, in effect required participation in a religious 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 594. 
 109. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989). 
 110. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 111. Id. 
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exercise.”112  The Court uses the terms “offense, embarrassment and 
intrusion” to define the dissenter’s injuries.113 
The coercion test becomes applicable when the federal 
government’s (or the local community’s) free exercise of religion 
creates an indirect, subtle, yet psychologically coercive atmosphere 
for objectors.  In the Declaration, we observe the free exercise and 
expression of religion by the government itself, not a clergy member.  
The mere fact that students have little choice but to encounter the 
religious language of the Declaration is enough to create an 
atmosphere of psychological coercion wherein dissenters may 
reasonably feel that the government is forcing them to believe the 
religious doctrine contained therein. 
Contemporary coercion doctrine is violated when an individual is 
psychologically injured by offensive, embarrassing and intrusive 
religious expression that is diverse from her particular religious 
beliefs and choices.  Unfortunately, for the rest of the community—
because of psychological peer pressure—she is unable to endure the 
free exercise of religion without colorable offense. 
F. The Naivety of Neutrality 
The Declaration finds no support from four of the above tests of 
the Court because the entire paradigm of government neutrality with 
religion is wrought with frailty.  Neutrality is an impossible task, 
especially at the place the Court has labored most fervently—the 
public schoolhouse.  In the land of secular neutrality, religion comes 
strolling into the schoolroom unnoticed.  When the individual 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. Of course, the school district and the rest of the students who are forced to abandon 
their long-standing religious tradition at the command of the Court face actual coercion and 
substantive injury. 
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community’s version of God (which is much like the Declaration’s) is 
taken out, the religions of neutrality are inadvertently brought in.  A 
total, integrated system of education can never be devoid of moral 
values—and values must be integrated from somewhere.  If not 
theistic values, then humanistic; if not supernatural, then natural—
etcetera.  The religions of secular humanism, naturalism and 
religious plurality presently provide the framework for the moral 
values transmitted in the federally-controlled public schools of 
today.114 
Indeed, the concept of neutrality is an idealistic cloud that never 
can be caught.  It is one of the most simplistic and naive schools of 
thought ever entertained by the Court. It is a place where all religions 
are equal, which means none transcend man—man must become 
and remain the measure of all things.  The transcendent God of the 
Declaration, whom our founders appealed to and trusted in, is now 
equal to any god of anyone’s imagination or to the belief in no god at 
all.  Unfortunately, that system of belief cannot long support the 
freedom America has known and enjoyed.  Without a firm reliance 
upon the God of our unalienable rights, we are left with no rights at 
all—merely the fancy of the federal government.  Without the 
conviction of individual responsibility and duty to the God of the 
Declaration, we are left with subjective license, not objective liberty. 
 
 114. An anonymous proverb says that, “the philosophy of the schoolroom in one generation 
will be the philosophy of the government in the next.”  That proverb which is often erroneously 
credited to Abraham Lincoln might also be expressed this way: The philosophy in the schoolroom 
in one generation will be the philosophy of the culture in the next.  Depending on whether you 
believe our culture has progressed or digressed in the area of morality, you have the Supreme 
Court to either thank or curse.  But before you make assessment, consider the question of whether 
your present thinking could be a product of the coercive “machinery” of the Court. See McCollum 
v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212, 217 (1948) (establishing “coercion” as a possible impermissible 
violation of the Establishment Clause); see also supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
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Application of currently controlling neutrality precedent leads us 
to the inescapable conclusion that the United States Declaration of 
Independence is unconstitutional and hence, illegal as written.115  
(Another possible, and more likely conclusion, however, is that 
Supreme Court rulings on establishment cases have been 
unconstitutional and hence illegal since 1947.)  We, therefore, should 
not be surprised at the state of Establishment Clause doctrine and 
jurisprudence.  Beginning with the spurious command of state 
neutrality and prohibition of aiding or preferring religion, to secular 
purpose, to non-advancement of religion, to excessive entanglement 
with religion, to non-preference of religion over non-religion, to 
subjective emotional tests to determine government coercion and 
endorsement of religion, we arrive sixty years later at the current 
state of establishment doctrine and culture.  If the proper gravamen 
for establishment constitutionality is neutrality, there could hardly be 
a greater violator of the law than the Declaration itself with its appeal 
to and firm reliance upon the Creator and “Supreme Judge of the 
world.”116 
V 
THE SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE:  
OVERRULE EVERSON AND LET FREEDOM RING 
The observation of Justice Thomas that the time has come to 
begin the process of rethinking Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
was made in the context of realizing that contemporary doctrine 
 
 115. Recognizing the absurd truth of that sentence should goad us on to understand the 
absurdities of contemporary establishment doctrine. A revelatory test for the tests is to square 
them with the Declaration, observing where and how they conflict. 
 116. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
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views the U.S. flag pledge as favoring religion over non-religion; and 
thus it renders the pledge illegal.117 
In his concurring opinion in Elk Grove, Justice Thomas makes the 
argument that the First Amendment’s religion clauses divide between 
the states’ rights of non-interference regarding establishment and 
individual liberty rights regarding free exercise.118  Therefore, the 
learned Justice accepts the following: 
[T]he Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an individual 
right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  But the Establishment Clause is another matter.  
The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest 
that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress 
from interfering with state establishments.  Thus, unlike the Free 
Exercise Clause, which does protect an individual right, it makes 
little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause.  In any case, 
I do not believe that the Pledge policy infringes any religious 
liberty right that would arise from incorporation of the Clause. 
Because the Pledge policy also does not infringe any free-exercise 
rights, I conclude that it is constitutional.119 
In the above quote, the Justice accepts the longstanding doctrine 
of selective incorporation but concludes that the Establishment 
Clause “resists incorporation,” which is another way of saying that 
the clause should never have been absorbed and applied against the 
states.  Since only fundamental rights of individual liberty are 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment from the Bill of 
Rights, and considering that the Establishment Clause “does not 
 
 117. See Elk Grove Unified  Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“I conclude that, as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is 
unconstitutional.”).  The flag pledge also prefers monotheistic religion over non-monotheistic 
religion inasmuch as it refers to God and not gods. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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protect an individual right,” incorporating the clause is “difficult to 
understand.”120 
Justice Thomas believes the best argument for finding an 
individual, fundamental right within the Establishment Clause 
springs from the position that one has a right “to be free from 
coercive federal establishments [of religion].”121  Certainly that right 
protects the states and, like all federalism provisions, individual 
rights are realized.  There is no need to incorporate the clause, 
however, when it is already fully functional and capable of guarding 
against federal encroachment and protecting individual rights. 
Under the Thomas view, the Supreme Court would reverse 
Everson and thus duly limit itself under the authority of the federal 
Establishment Clause and the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
The Court, therefore, would not address the Elk Grove School 
District’s pledge policy;122 the federal tribunal would only address the 
question of whether Congress had established religion with its 
relevant pledge legislation.123 
A. Overview of the Doctrine of Incorporation 
At this point some background might be in order to extrapolate 
the reasoning of Justice Thomas. It is important to remember that 
the establishment barrier did not become blurred until the 
 
 120. Id. at 50.  I would argue that incorporating the Establishment Clause is more than 
difficult to understand; it is beyond reason. 
 121. Id. at 50–51. 
 122. The California courts would decide the constitutionality of the policy based upon the 
California Constitution. That state’s Declaration of Rights employs language strikingly similar to 
the First Amendment federalism clause: “The Legislature shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”  CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4. Precisely what that means would rest with the 
ruling of the California Supreme Court, not the federal courts. 
 123. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2047, at 1 (1942) (“The purpose of this joint resolution is to provide 
an authoritative guide to those civilians who desire to use the flag correctly.”); S. REP. NO. 77-
1477, at 2 (1942) (same). 
05__KULIGOWSKI.DOC 11/1/2007  3:56:30 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 328 ? 
Establishment Clause was applied against the states.124  Though 
Justice Thomas draws attention to the problems of incorporating one 
particular clause, the broader question is aptly phrased as follows: 
“Did the 14th Amendment’s due process clause make the Bill of 
Rights—originally adopted as limits addressed solely to the federal 
government—applicable to the states as well?”125 
When the Supreme Court began hearing challenges involving the 
novel proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment126 might 
incorporate certain rights from the Bill of Rights, the overwhelming 
consensus maintained that the purposes of and historic distinctions 
between the first ten Amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment 
must remain alive.  We have already reviewed some of Justice 
Marshall’s language, prior to the post-Civil War Amendments, 
rejecting the claim that the just compensation provision of the Fifth 
Amendment should be applicable to the states—in the 1833 case of 
Barron v. City Council of Baltimore.127 
The Court’s first assessment of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears in the Slaughter-House Cases, wherein Justice Miller rejected 
the claim that the privileges and immunities, due process and equal 
 
 124. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (“The [Establishment] Clause erects a 
‘blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier . . . .’” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 
(1971))). 
 125. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394 (12th ed., Foundation Press, Inc. 1991). 
 126. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868, to fix a specific problem at the 
national level. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1873) (emphasizing that the 
purposes of the 13th, 14th, and 15th were “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm 
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from 
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”).  A national 
war had been fought to preserve the union of the states—with the major contention being the 
existence of slavery. The 14th Amendment states in its first section: “[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Here we find 
specific, enumerated powers delegated to Congress to bring all states into compliance with the 
requirements of the post-Civil War Amendment. 
 127. 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833); see supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
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protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are capable of 
expanding beyond their original purpose of eliminating the legal 
disparities between former slaves and the rest of the population.128 
Interestingly, in Slaughter-House, no claims of incorporating any 
provisions from the Bill of Rights were advanced.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was properly viewed as a quid pro quo provision which 
addressed a specific problem and stood independent of the first ten 
federalism Amendments.129  Justice Field, in dissent, argued not only 
that the state-authorized business monopoly at issue should have 
been broken, but deemed the independent power of the Fourteenth 
Amendment capable of doing so.130  Indeed, borrowing Connecticut 
precedent, Justice Field cites a state Supreme Court opinion striking 
down an impartial state grant which restricted the livelihood of 
others.  His dissent quotes the Connecticut Court holding that, 
“although we have no direct constitutional provision against a 
monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free government is opposed to 
such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may be 
derived from the [Connecticut] Bill of Rights, the first section of 
which declares ‘that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive 
public emoluments or privileges from the community,’ to render 
them void.”131 It appears Connecticut did have a direct constitutional 
provision in the first section of its own Bill of Rights; nevertheless, 
the point is that Justice Field did not view the Fourteenth 
 
 128. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1873). 
 129. Thus, the Court refused to provide relief, believing that (a) it lacked authority, and (b) 
the states were capable of governing themselves through the democratic process. Id. at 82. 
 130. By independent, the author means an enforcement power autonomous from the Bill of 
Rights. 
 131. Id. at 108–09 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas 
Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856)). 
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Amendment as requiring the aid of the federalism Bill of Rights to 
enforce its purposes. 
Justice Field was somewhat on track—the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require the assistance of the Bill of Rights, but 
only the aid of Congress to accomplish its purposes.132  In fact, an 
often overlooked limitation is that the federal courts have no 
authority to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. Indeed, 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[t]he 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”133  That important clause should limit the 
power of the Supreme Court to merely resolving actual cases and 
controversies involving the duly enacted legislation of the Congress 
in relation to enforcement of the Amendment,134 if and when 
necessary. The specific authority delegated to Congress is quite 
unique and specific. (Similarly, the specific authority withheld from 
Congress in the Establishment Clause is quite unique and specific.) 
That specific authority, if followed, ensures that the Fourteenth 
Amendment will not produce additional, non-ratified constitutional 
amendments in the form of judicial rulings.135 If the word Congress 
had retained its meaning in the Fourteenth, it would still mean 
Congress in the context of the First Amendment.  Enforcing the 
 
 132. Unfortunately, the Court was the obstacle to the Fourteenth Amendment’s function in 
that after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court ruled a great deal of 
the act unconstitutional. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 134. That implies that Congress must give definition to the imprecise requirements of the 
Amendment. 
 135. As Justice Brandeis aptly stated in his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 
(1926 ): “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to 
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was . . . to save 
the people from autocracy.” 
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Fourteenth Amendment via its legislation, Congress could not have 
incorporated the religion clause. 
When the incorporation debate began and developed, two 
significant mistakes were made. The first was bypassing the exclusive 
authority delegated to Congress, and the second was looking to the 
federalism provisions of the Bill of Rights to define the Fourteenth 
Amendment.136 
The core issue in Barron was whether a clause from the first ten 
amendments could be used against the states.137  That notion was 
soundly rejected. When the Court considered the question of 
incorporation later in Palko v. Connecticut,138 the slope of descent the 
Court headed down appeared neither to be very steep nor slippery 
because the context provided a natural setting for the Fourteenth 
Amendment to find expression. Within an arena relating to what the 
Fourteenth Amendment logically requires—protection within the 
context of criminal proceedings—the Court considered which rights 
were essential to fundamental principles of liberty.  There was, of 
course, no need to absorb any clause from the Bill of Rights to give 
substance to the Fourteenth; but the contrary reasoning seemed 
harmless enough at the time.139 
 
 136. If the Court had not overruled significant protections of the original Civil Rights Act of 
1875, the Fourteenth Amendment would have found immediate legislative definition and 
contextual expression. In our context, the federal court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment to 
justify its interference in state religion. 
 137. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). 
 138. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the issue was whether the double jeopardy protection of 
the Fifth Amendment gives definition and force to the Fourteenth, thus requiring the states to 
comply with the federal mandate by federal mandate. 
 139. In addition to deferring to Congress, the preferred reasoning would have involved 
viewing the two independent Amendments as mirroring some of the same protections—with 
discrepancies being allowed or resolved by the Democratic process of the states. 
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During the early-mid period of the 20th century, Justice Cardozo 
and his faction articulated the doctrine of selective incorporation 
convincingly enough that it continues to occupy the majority view.140  
Justice Black, et al., advocated the doctrine of full-scale incorporation 
of the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights, believing this 
would lend itself to a more objective jurisprudence: 
Wholesale incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the 14th 
Amendment continues to be rejected by the Court; but the 
modern Court’s technique of selective incorporation has achieved 
virtually the same result—nearly all of the procedural [and 
substantive] protections in the first eight amendments now apply 
to the states . . . .141 
The irony that Justice Black lived to see is that, by using the Bill of 
Rights as inverted precedent, the violence inflicted upon its language 
rendered many of its provisions (including the Establishment Clause) 
entirely subjective, and thus capable of interpretation by the Supreme 
Court alone. 
Incorporation began with process and criminal procedure and 
incrementally extended into substantive due process, arriving at the 
current place whereby individual rights are created from shadows 
and penumbras hidden within secret chambers of the Constitution 
(and only the priests of the high Court may traverse the sacred 
passageways).142 
When Justice Thomas says that he accepts the incorporation of 
the Free Exercise Clause, but not the Establishment Clause,143 he is 
 
 140. See GUNTHER, supra note 125, at 409–11. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that although the 
Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy, the specific guarantees within the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras that create a zone of privacy free from governmental interference). 
 143. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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saying that even accepting the current doctrine of incorporating 
clauses relating to individual rights, establishment is a federal 
prohibition that protects states’ rights.  Therefore, the Court may not 
legitimately incorporate a state protection that does not primarily 
confer individual rights. 
Though the reasoning of Justice Thomas is sound, a more 
historically satisfying view is that the first ten amendments are all 
federalism provisions that protect the states and the people from the 
federal government. 
B. A High Wall Separates the Bill of Rights from the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
One cannot overlook the fact that we find two clauses of due 
process in the same Constitution.144  Both require the defining 
legislation of Congress.  With respect to the former, we find federal 
rules of criminal procedure, etcetera; and with the second, we find 
Congressional acts of civil rights, etcetera.145  The Court’s role is 
implicitly limited in the first and expressly limited in the second. 
Whatever the due process that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires of the states, its process and scope must find definition from 
 
 144. The first, of course, is in the Fifth Amendment and the other in the Fourteenth. The 
added language of equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment makes life, liberty and 
property due process functional for a specific group of people. The force of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is that the former slaves shall not be denied due process and, of course, process is 
meaningless unless all laws are applied equally. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights provides protection from the power of the federal government. The unique 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was voted on and ratified to extend federal 
power to protect a specific group from inequitable state law. There is no other reason for having 
two due process clauses in the same constitution. The Bill of Rights was meant to be an enduring 
safeguard for the states—to incorporate the religion clause is to surrender the very liberty the 
founders earnestly intended to secure. 
 145. Part of the Court’s self-inflicted problem is that after Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, the Supreme Court ruled a large amount of the act unconstitutional. See supra note 
132 and accompanying text. The Court actually caused the Fourteenth Amendment problem it 
later set out to unilaterally resolve. 
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Congress; otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment could simply read 
as follows: “This amendment makes the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment equally applicable to the states, incorporating all 
the rights and restrictions contained in the Bill of Rights.”  The first 
line of defense against the potential misuse of the Fourteenth 
Amendment rests with Congress and the Tenth Amendment.146  
Those two sources of authority were meant to be the twin guardians 
of the federalism provisions, ensuring that the Bill of Rights 
perpetually remains the federalism Bill of Rights.  Otherwise, without 
distinct federalism provision and operation, our system of 
government goes from a federal republic to a centrally controlled 
oligarchy—rule (in the area of religious expression) by nine 
unelected officials.  It was mentioned earlier that the tremors from 
the Everson ruling would lead to earth-shaking societal results, but 
first the Constitution itself would be shaken by the doctrine of 
incorporation. 
The Supreme Court, as implied above, transgressed its boundary 
line and has gone on to write positive constitutional language.  In 
order to cross the boundary line at the Bill of Rights, the Court 
miraculously parted the Tenth Amendment with its gavel and walked 
through on seemingly dry and solid ground.  During its quick 
passage, the Court, on its way to ravage other amendments, stripped 
the Amendment of any real force and effect.  The Court, in essence, 
eviscerated the power of the Tenth Amendment, girding itself up 
with its authority, leaving the amendment naked and empty of 
meaning. 
 
 146. The Tenth Amendment reads as follows: “The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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So while your present writer agrees with Justice Thomas that the 
Establishment Clause resists incorporation, I would argue that every 
clause in the Bill of Rights resists incorporation.  Indeed, the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a provision that stands independent of the 
Bill of Rights which must be enforced by the legislation of Congress 
alone.  Strict construction of the Constitution’s language is necessary 
for the same reason the principle is necessary in all matters of judicial 
interpretation—the language represents the will of the people.  
Express legislative language must be followed and obeyed. It is the 
restraining yoke of democracy.  The Court has declared substantial 
matters of state religious expression unconstitutional without the 
counsel of the real Constitution. Certainly, the Constitution would 
not have been ratified by the states with a version of the Bill of Rights 
as amended by the Court.147 
“Government of the people, by the people and for the people”148 is 
the battle-cry of the doctrine of federal judicial restraint.149 Under 
that view, actual diversity can flourish. Religious values from state to 
state, city to city and county to county are free to diverge. Dissenters 
of a particular state’s tradition or practice may work through the 
democratic process via the state’s legislative body for change—or 
through city council or the local school board. In the alternative, 
dissenters are free to move to states (or to cities or counties) whose 
citizens have similar religious or non-religious values and beliefs. 
 
 147. The Constitution hardly would have been ratified without adding the assurance 
contained in the First Amendment that the federal government could never meddle with the 
religion of the states. The states were once armed with the power of the First Amendment to 
ensure their own religious freedoms. Presently, on the contrary, dissenters may employ the power 
of the federal government to use the Constitution to control the states, cities, counties and school 
districts across the entire country. 
 148. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (emphasis added). 
 149. Realizing that judicial restraint involves discretion, I concede that restraint is not used to 
convey what I ultimately argue, but inasmuch as the Court operates with unquestioned 
jurisdiction, it has opportunity to abstain from governing the religious affairs of the states. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
If following current Supreme Court precedent and thinking 
produces the compelling result that the United States Declaration of 
Independence contains language that is offensive and prohibited by 
the United States Constitution, then certainly, we have a fatal 
problem with the state of Establishment Clause doctrine.  If that area 
of jurisprudence is in fact dead, then let the jurists of the country not 
seek to revive a lifeless body of law. Let the corpse be given a 
respectful burial and let us start afresh.150 
As noted above, Everson was wrongly decided on two points.151  
The first was that the Establishment Clause is absorbable and 
applicable against the states.  And the second was that the clause 
requires federal and state neutrality with religion.  Rather than 
insistently attempting to put a square peg into a round hole, the 
Honorable Court will tread honorable ground in admitting the 
mistake of Everson. 
Certainly, the Court will have to admit a mistake of titanic 
proportion and implication—much like it did, looking back to its 
early civil rights rulings.152  “If you are on the wrong road,” writes C. 
S. Lewis, “progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to 
the right road; and in that case the man who turns back soonest is the 
 
 150. Concurring in Lamb’s Chapel v. Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993), 
Justice Scalia wrote that the Lemon test is “like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .” 
However, even nailing Lemon’s coffin tightly will not solve the Court’s problem unless the entire 
fallacious doctrine of government neutrality is buried with it. 
 151. See supra part III subsection A. 
 152. See generally Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. 393 
(19 How. 393) (1857). Incidentally, application of the higher law of the Declaration would have 
compelled different results in the Court’s early civil rights cases. 
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most progressive man.”153  The Court has inflicted Dred-ful wounds 
on the nation in the past and suppressing the religious expression of 
the nation and her communities for over five decades is likewise no 
small matter.154 
The present Court must remedy its self-inflicted wound.  The 
time has come for a majority of the Justices to lay hold of the helm of 
the federal bench and steer the Court back to navigable waters. 
The practice of incorporation began selectively and grew 
incrementally.  Likewise, the way back to restoring power to the 
states and the people must begin selectively and grow incrementally.  
Certainly, there is no better place to begin than with the clause that 
protects the religious rights of the individual states from the power of 
the centralized government.  A declaration of non-jurisdiction over 
matters of state religious affairs is the sweet melody that must sound 
forth from the Court crier.  Sometimes, as Justice Brandeis once said 
of the Court, “[t]he most important thing we do is not doing.”155 
True religious freedom and diversity will abound only after 
centralized control is relinquished.  Attempts to immediately remedy 
perceived problems through autonomous decrees of the Supreme 
Court have caused religious repression, smothering the free 
expression that democracy requires.156  When the Court circumvents 
 
 153. C. S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 28 (1980). 
 154. When the Court intervened in a certain political controversy, Justice Breyer, borrowing a 
phrase of Justice Hughes, was concerned about risking “a self-inflicted wound—a wound that may 
harm not just the Court, but the Nation.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 155. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71 (1962). 
 156. It seems that the Court has been on a long-standing crusade in the area of individual 
rights (where the heckler is disproportionately exalted) in an effort, perhaps, to compensate for its 
initial, morally repulsive rulings on civil rights. Thus, when a heckler cries, “I’m offended,” the 
Court sees the issue as an individual religious right (to not be offended) rather than as a 
community religious right of free expression of religion. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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the expressed will of the people, its nine members set themselves up 
as omniscient philosopher-kings who must govern according to what 
only they know is best. 
If the Supreme Court will not fix its epic constitutional crisis, 
then it may well be time for the People to fix the problem by limiting 
the jurisdiction of its nine robe-wearing public servants via their 
representative bodies.  To the degree America has retained her 
conviction that her rights are from God, she will be able to stand 
against the overreaching rulings of the federal judicial branch. 
